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The district court certified a nationwide class (and a California-only 
subclass) of all non-Yahoo Mail users who have emailed with Yahoo Mail 
subscribers—in other words, virtually every email user without a Yahoo Mail 
account.  Plaintiffs seek to wield this class to challenge Yahoo’s business practices 
involving automated scanning of email, contending that, when conducted without 
consent, those practices violate the California Invasion of Privacy Act (CIPA) and 
the federal Stored Communications Act (SCA).  
Immediate review of the certification order is warranted for three reasons: 
First, plaintiffs have no standing to seek the prospective relief they seek—an 
injunction (and declaration) barring Yahoo’s scanning of emails for any purpose 
(including scanning to identify and block spam, malware, and viruses).  It is black 
letter law that plaintiffs must have standing for the particular remedies they seek 
and that they cannot rely on purported past wrongs as a basis for prospective relief.  
Yet alleged past injury is (at most) the only one plaintiffs have here.  Because 
plaintiffs know about Yahoo’s email scanning practices and continue to send email 
to Yahoo users, they necessarily consent to those practices.  They thus have no 
entitlement to prospective relief barring alleged nonconsensual scanning.  As the 
district court recognized, district courts in this Circuit are deeply divided on the 
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 2  
availability of injunctive relief under these circumstances.  This Court should grant 
immediate review to decide this fundamental and unresolved question. 
Second, the certified class is unascertainable because there is no objective or 
administratively feasible criteria through which class membership can be 
determined.  Consent is a central issue in this case.  A class member who has 
consented to Yahoo’s practices has no claim under CIPA or the SCA.  Yet 
determining who has not consented (and thus is part of the class) requires an 
individualized, fact-specific inquiry.  In addition, Yahoo cannot reliably determine 
which non-Yahoo Mail subscribers are located in California, defeating the 
ascertainability of the California-only subclass for that reason as well.   
Rather than require plaintiffs to meet this requirement, however, the district 
court held it inapplicable to claims for injunctive relief.  The district court correctly 
noted that this Court has not decided that question.  The court went on to 
incorrectly state, however, that every other Circuit to address it has held that a Rule 
23(b)(2) class need not be ascertainable. In fact, the Fifth and Seventh Circuits 
have required Rule 23(b)(2) classes to meet the requirement, and under the 
approach adopted by those courts, this class could not have been certified.  Review 
should be granted to decide this fundamental and unresolved question as well. 
Third, the district court’s certification order manifestly erred by misapplying 
the cohesiveness and commonality requirements.  Given that only some class 
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 3  
members may be eligible for injunctive relief (due to their lack of consent), there is 
no cohesive class such that Yahoo’s conduct “can be enjoined or declared unlawful 
only as to all of the class members or as to none of them.”  Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. 
Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2557 (2011).  The fact-specific and individualized inquiry 
required to determine consent likewise defeats commonality.  It is not enough for 
there to be some common questions—every purported class would meet that 
standard.  Instead, there must be common questions that lead to common answers 
that will drive the resolution of the case.  Because the issue of consent cannot be 
litigated on a classwide basis, the district court erred by certifying the class.  
Indeed, in a virtually identical suit against Google, the same district court 
declined to certify a class of email users precisely because of the highly 
individualized issue of consent.  In an attempt to avoid that fate, plaintiffs here 
jettisoned their damages claim and sought certification under only Rule 23(b)(2).  
But no amount of tactical maneuvering and repackaging can alter the fundamental 
fact that overwhelming individual issues render this case ill-suited for resolution on 
a classwide basis. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
1. Whether the district court incorrectly decided an unsettled and 
fundamental issue of law when it held that Article III’s standing requirements 
governing prospective relief can be relaxed in the consumer protection context. 
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 4  
2. Whether the district court incorrectly decided an unsettled and 
fundamental issue of law when it held, in conflict with the Fifth and Seventh 
Circuits, that a Rule 23(b)(2) class need not be ascertainable. 
3. Whether the district court committed manifest error when it certified a 
class that did not meet Rule 23(a)(2)’s commonality requirement and 
Rule 23(b)(2)’s cohesiveness requirement because the central issue in the case is 
the fact-specific and individualized inquiry into consent to Yahoo’s business 
practices. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
A. Background 
Yahoo operates Yahoo Mail as a free web-based email service with more 
than 275 million subscribers.  App. 2.  Yahoo scans both incoming and outgoing 
email to protect users and non-users from spam, malware and viruses.  App. 59-61 
¶¶ 3-4, 9-13; App. 119:11-15.  Scanning also allows Yahoo to provide relevant 
advertising, product features, and free email services to current and future users.  
App. 117:18-118:1.  
Plaintiffs are four individuals who do not subscribe to Yahoo Mail but who 
communicate with Yahoo Mail users by email.  App. 2.  Plaintiffs claim that 
nonconsensual scanning for any purpose, including for spam, malware and virus 
protection, is unlawful under CIPA and the SCA and thus should be enjoined.   
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The SCA provides that “a person or entity providing an electronic 
communication service to the public shall not knowingly divulge to any person or 
entity the contents of a communication while in electronic storage by that service.”  
18 U.S.C. § 2702(a)(1).  That prohibition does not apply where any party to the 
communication has consented:  “A provider described in subsection (a) may 
divulge the contents of a communication . . . with the lawful consent of the 
originator or an addressee or intended recipient of such communication, or the 
subscriber in the case of remote computing service.”  Id. § 2702(b)(3).  CIPA 
prohibits interception of a communication while it is in transit “without the consent 
of all parties to the communication.”  Cal. Penal Code § 631(a). 
In a previous order dismissing several of plaintiffs’ claims, the district court 
held that Yahoo Mail subscribers consent to having their emails intercepted and 
scanned when they agree to Yahoo’s terms of services.  App. 47-48.  Many non-
Yahoo Mail subscribers also have knowledge of Yahoo’s email scanning and thus 
consent to the practice when they communicate by e-mail with Yahoo Mail users.  
Yahoo discloses its email scanning (and possible sharing of email content with 
third parties) on webpages to inform the public of its business practices.  App. 131-
164; see also App. 165-173.  For example, the “Yahoo Mail” page states that 
“Yahoo! provides personally relevant product features, content, and advertising, 
and spam and malware detection by scanning and analyzing Mail, Messenger, and 
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 6  
other communications content” and that “[s]ome of these features and advertising 
will be based on our understanding of the content and meaning of your 
communications.”  App. 66.  News of Yahoo’s email scanning also has been 
widely disseminated by the press and on the internet.  E.g., App. 125-126; App. 
128.  All of the named plaintiffs in this case continue to send emails to Yahoo Mail 
users, even though plaintiffs are fully informed about Yahoo’s business practices.  
App. 71-100; App. 103:11-14; App. 106:25-107:5; App. 110:10-17; App. 113:23-
114:10. 
As the district court noted, however, not all non-Yahoo Mail users are aware 
of Yahoo’s practices.  App. 6.  Thus, the issue of which non-Yahoo Mail users in 
plaintiffs’ proposed class have consented to Yahoo’s business practices—and thus 
have no claim—is a central and highly individualized issue in the dispute. 
B. The District Court’s Certification Order 
In a similar action against Google, the same district court denied class 
certification because “individualized questions with respect to consent” would 
“likely . . . overwhelm any common issues.”  In re Google Inc. Gmail Litig., 2014 
WL 1102660, at *21 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 18, 2014).  The complaint in this case (like 
the one in In re Google) also sought damages and thus asserted allegations with 
respect to Rule 23(b)(3).  Nonetheless, plaintiffs here abandoned their claim for 
class-wide monetary relief in an attempt to avoid the fate of the In re Google 
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 7  
plaintiffs and instead moved to certify only a Rule 23(b)(2) class for injunctive and 
declaratory relief.  Plaintiffs sought to certify a class of “all persons in the United 
States who are not Yahoo Mail subscribers and who have sent emails to or 
received emails from a Yahoo Mail subscriber from October 2, 2011 to the present, 
or who will send emails to or receive emails from a Yahoo Mail subscriber in the 
future.”  App. 53.   
The district court certified the requested class under the SCA, and a 
California-only class under CIPA.  App. 44.  Even though plaintiffs have continued 
to send emails to Yahoo Mail subscribers since learning about Yahoo’s business 
practices and thus have no future injury, the court held that plaintiffs had standing 
to seek a forward-looking injunction.  App. 10.  The court noted that several 
district courts in the Ninth Circuit have concluded that other “plaintiffs lacked 
standing to seek injunctive relief because (1) the plaintiffs failed to assert that they 
intended to engage in the injury producing conduct in the future, and (2) the 
plaintiffs’ knowledge of the defendants’ wrongful conduct meant that plaintiffs 
could not articulate a future injury.”  App. 11-12.  The district court sided, 
however, with a separate group of district courts that have “rejected this 
proposition as overly narrow in the consumer protection context.”  App. 12. 
In addition, the district court held that a Rule 23(b)(2) class need not be 
ascertainable, i.e., that there need be no mechanism for identifying class members.  
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In reaching that conclusion, the court expressly acknowledged that this Court had 
never addressed it.  App. 27-28. 
The district court also held that plaintiffs’ proposed class met 
Rule 23(a)(2)’s commonality and Rule 23(b)(2)’s cohesiveness requirements.  The 
court acknowledged that “Yahoo may be correct that consent could present legal 
and factual questions that are not common to the proposed class,” but the court 
dismissed that concern on the ground that there are some “other common legal and 
factual questions” that could be resolved classwide.  App. 19.  The court likewise 
rejected Yahoo’s argument that the proposed class lacks cohesiveness.  The court 
decided it did not matter some class members consented.    App. 31-32.  All that 
mattered in the court’s view was that some other class members might not have 
consented and could be entitled to relief.  App. 32. 
REASONS FOR GRANTING INTERLOCUTORY REVIEW 
Immediate review of a class certification order under Rule 23(f) of the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is appropriate if, among other reasons, “the 
certification decision presents an unsettled and fundamental issue of law relating to 
class actions, important both to the specific litigation and generally, that is likely to 
evade end-of-the-case review” or “the district court’s class certification decision is 
manifestly erroneous.”  Chamberlan v. Ford Motor Co., 402 F.3d 952, 959 (9th 
Cir. 2005).  The district court’s certification of a class of email users, 
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notwithstanding individualized questions of consent, satisfies these requirements in 
multiple respects.   
I. REVIEW SHOULD BE GRANTED BECAUSE COURTS ARE 
DIVIDED OVER ARTICLE III’S REQUIREMENTS IN THE 
CONSUMER PROTECTION CONTEXT 
As the district court recognized, the district courts in this Circuit are divided 
on the requirements for Article III standing to secure prospective relief in the 
consumer protection context.  App. 11-13.  The Court should grant this petition to 
decide that question.  See Lierboe v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 350 F.3d 
1018, 1022-23 (9th Cir. 2003) (deciding Article III standing of named plaintiff as a 
necessary threshold issue in review of class certification order under Rule 23(f)). 
A. Standing In The Consumer Protection Context Has Divided 
District Courts In The Circuit 
The district court noted that “four district court cases from this circuit” have 
held that plaintiffs “lacked standing to seek injunctive relief because (1) the 
plaintiffs failed to assert that they intended to engage in the injury producing 
conduct in the future, and (2) the plaintiffs’ knowledge of the defendants’ wrongful 
conduct meant that plaintiffs could not articulate a future injury.”  App. 11-12 
(citing cases).  As the district court implicitly acknowledged (App. 11-12), the 
class here could not have been certified under that approach because plaintiffs 
would lack standing to seek injunctive relief.  They know of Yahoo’s business 
practices and have implicitly consented to those practices by continuing to send 
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emails to Yahoo Mail subscribers.  App. 71-100; App. 103:11-14; App. 106:25-
107:5; App. 110:10-17; App. 113:23-114:10.  Plaintiffs therefore cannot show any 
risk of being subject to alleged statutory violations in the future. 
The district court declined to follow these decisions because, in its view, 
they are “overly narrow in the consumer protection context.”  App. 12.  Instead, 
the court relied upon a contrary line of intra-circuit district court authority holding 
that, in consumer class actions, the existence of past injuries are sufficient to 
establish standing to secure future injunctive relief.  See App. 12-13 (citing cases).  
As demonstrated by the acknowledged and deepening disagreement among the 
district courts on this “unsettled and fundamental issue” of standing law 
(Chamberlan, 402 F.3d at 959), this Court has not had an opportunity to address 
this question.  It should grant this petition in order to do so. 
B. The District Court’s Standing Ruling Cannot Be Reconciled With 
Article III’s Requirements 
The district court’s conclusion that it could certify an injunction-only class 
in the absence of any showing by plaintiffs of risk of future injury was incorrect.  
The district court apparently believed that traditional Article III requirements are 
“overly narrow in the consumer protection context,” App. 12, because they might 
“have the functional effect of precluding injunctive relief” once a plaintiff knew 
the cause of the injury, App. 13. 
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The Supreme Court has rejected the argument that a desire to afford 
remedies to plaintiffs justifies relaxing Article III’s requirements.  In Clapper v. 
Amnesty International USA, 133 S. Ct. 1138 (2013), for example, the Court 
declined to find standing notwithstanding the argument that its absence would 
“insulate the government’s surveillance activities from meaningful judicial 
review.”  Id. at 1154.  The Court instead reiterated its long held rule:  “‘[t]he 
assumption that if respondents have no standing to sue, no one would have 
standing, is not a reason to find standing.’”  Id.  (alteration in original) (citation 
omitted). 
Far from relaxing standing rules for claims that might otherwise evade 
review, the Supreme Court and this Court have consistently held that standing 
“requires federal courts to satisfy themselves that the plaintiff has alleged such a 
personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to warrant his invocation of 
federal-court jurisdiction.”  Summers v. Earth Island Inst., 555 U.S. 488, 493 
(2009) (emphasis in original) (internal quotation marks omitted).  This means that 
the plaintiff “bears the burden of showing that he has standing for each type of 
relief sought.”  Id. 
For injunctive relief, there must be an “actual and imminent” threat, id., and 
“past wrongs do not in themselves amount to that real and immediate threat of 
injury,” City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 103 (1983); see id. at 111-12; 
  Case: 15-80101, 06/09/2015, ID: 9568266, DktEntry: 1-1, Page 16 of 27
 
 
 12  
Bates v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 511 F.3d 974, 985 (9th Cir. 2007) (explaining 
that injunctive relief requires a plaintiff to demonstrate “‘a sufficient likelihood 
that he will again be wronged in a similar way’” (quoting Lyons, 461 U.S. at 111)).  
Thus, in the context of a class action, this Court has explained that the named 
plaintiffs themselves must be entitled to the relief they seek.  Alleged injuries to 
unnamed members of the class are “simply irrelevant to the question whether the 
named plaintiffs are entitled to the injunctive relief they seek.”  Hodgers-Durgin v. 
De La Vina, 199 F.3d 1037, 1045 (9th Cir. 1999). 
The district court’s certification order contradicts these principles.  Plaintiffs 
all admit that they have continued to send emails to Yahoo Mail users with full 
knowledge that those emails would be scanned and their content would be stored 
and potentially shared.  App. 71-100; App. 103:11-14; App. 106:25-107:5; App. 
110:10-17; App. 113:23-114:10.  They therefore have no future injury—and thus 
any entitlement to an injunction—because any future scanning would take place 
with these plaintiffs’ consent.  Instead, plaintiffs can cite only alleged “past 
wrongs” to support their request for injunctive relief.  Lyons, 461 U.S. at 103; see 
id. at 111-12.  That is not enough.  See, e.g., Gest v. Bradbury, 443 F.3d 1177, 
1181 (9th Cir. 2006) (to have standing to seek injunctive relief, a plaintiff must 
demonstrate that she is “realistically threatened by a repetition of the violation”); 
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Hodgers-Durgin, 199 F.3d at 1045 (same); San Diego Cnty. Gun Rights Comm. v. 
Reno, 98 F.3d 1121, 1126 (9th Cir. 1996) (same). 
II. REVIEW IS ALSO WARRANTED BECAUSE THE DISTRICT 
COURT CERTIFIED UNASCERTAINABLE CLASSES 
The district court also (incorrectly) decided another “unsettled and 
fundamental issue” (Chamberlan, 402 F.3d at 959) relating to class certification 
that warrants this Court’s immediate review:  whether a Rule 23(b)(2) class must 
be ascertainable or definite. 
Under the ascertainability requirement, there must be some objective and 
administratively feasible criteria by which class membership can be determined.  
See Newberg on Class Actions § 3:3; see also, e.g., In re Hulu Privacy Litig., 2014 
WL 2758598, at *15-16 (N.D. Cal. June 16, 2014) (holding that class was not 
ascertainable because “the claims apparently are not amenable to ready 
verification” and “the court cannot tell how potential class members reliably could 
establish by affidavit the answers to the potential questions”). 
As the district court observed, this Court “has not expressly addressed the 
issue of whether the judicially implied ascertainability requirement applies when a 
plaintiff moves to certify a class only under Rule 23(b)(2),” as opposed to applying 
only to those certified under Rule 23(b)(3).  App. 27-28.  The district court then 
decided that open question by holding that there is no ascertainability requirement 
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for Rule 23(b)(2) classes, on the ground that “there will generally be no need to 
identify individual class members” in injunction-only classes.  App. 28-29. 
In the district court’s view, its jettisoning of the ascertainability requirement 
was supported by “every other circuit to address the issue.”  App. 28 (citing cases 
from the three circuits).  That is incorrect.  Both the Fifth and the Seventh Circuits 
require Rule 23(b)(2) classes to be ascertainable.  See DeBremaecker v. Short, 433 
F.2d 733, 734 (5th Cir. 1970) (holding in a Rule 23(b)(2) case that “[i]t is 
elementary that in order to maintain a class action, the class sought to be 
represented must be adequately defined and clearly ascertainable”); Adashunas v. 
Negley, 626 F.2d 600, 603-04 (7th Cir. 1980) (Rule 23(b)(2) class “of plaintiffs is 
so highly diverse and so difficult to identify that it is not adequately defined or 
nearly ascertainable.  Hence, for that reason, the plaintiff class cannot be 
maintained.”).  The disagreement among the other courts of appeals and the 
absence of authority from this Court on this fundamental question support 
immediate review in this case. 
The conclusion of the Fifth and Seventh Circuits are correct.  Numerous 
courts (including district courts in this Circuit) have recognized that the 
ascertainability requirement is derived from Rule 23(a), which applies to both Rule 
23(b)(2) and 23(b)(3) classes.  See generally Newberg on Class Actions § 3:2 
(explaining that courts “imply that the term ‘class’ in Rule 23(a) means a definite 
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or ascertainable class”); see also John v. Nat’l Sec. Fire & Cas. Co., 501 F.3d 443, 
445 (5th Cir. 2007) (“The existence of an ascertainable class of persons to be 
represented by the proposed class representative is an implied prerequisite of 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23.”); Keegan v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 284 
F.R.D. 504, 521 (C.D. Cal. 2012) (addressing Rule 23(a) and explaining that a 
class is ascertainable if it is “administratively feasible for the court to determine 
whether a particular individual is a member” using objective criteria); Forcellati v. 
Hyland’s, Inc., 2014 WL 1410264, at *5 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 9, 2014) (same).  “The 
rationale is that a court can only apply the Rule 23(a) prerequisites to a class whose 
members can be ascertained.”  Newberg on Class Actions § 3:2.  “In other words, 
courts state that they must be able to know who belongs to a class before they can 
determine the numerosity of the class, the commonality of the claims of the class 
members, or any of the other class certification prerequisites.”  Id. 
If properly applied, the ascertainability requirement would be dispositive 
here.  Plaintiffs sought certification of a sprawling class of unidentifiable non-
Yahoo Mail subscribers who have emailed or may in the future email Yahoo Mail 
users.  Yahoo does not have records that would even provide a way to identify 
each and every non-Yahoo Mail subscriber that has sent an email to or received an 
email from a Yahoo user.  App. 56 ¶¶ 2-6.  Nor can Yahoo determine whether a 
non-Yahoo Mail email address belongs to someone who is also a Yahoo Mail user 
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(and thus who would have consented to the Yahoo terms of service).   App. 56 ¶ 3.  
In fact, many email users maintain multiple email accounts, including all of the 
plaintiffs.  App. 71-100.  The district court’s California-only subclass of non-
Yahoo Mail subscribers is unascertainable for an additional reason.  The record 
establishes that Yahoo cannot reliably determine which non-Yahoo Mail 
subscribers are located in California.  App. 120:11-121:4.  Thus, there is no 
objective or administratively feasible means to define the class or sub-class of non-
Yahoo users.  Even if there were, there would be no objective means to determine 
which of these non-users have consented or will consent to Yahoo’s scanning 
practices.1 
III. THE DISTRICT COURT MANIFESTLY ERRED IN ITS 
COMMONALITY AND COHESIVENESS DETERMINATIONS 
Immediate review also is warranted because the district court committed 
manifest error in its class certification order.  Chamberlan, 402 F.3d at 959.  
                                           
1 In a cursory footnote, the district court stated in the alternative that 
assuming arguendo that the ascertainability requirement did apply, plaintiffs would 
meet it.  App. 29 n.8.  The district court identified “class member self-
identification” as a procedure that “may” be a “reliable” tool for identifying who 
should be in the class.  App. 29 n.8 (emphasis added).  The court made no finding 
that such class identification by honor system actually would be reliable.  Nor did 
the court attempt to explain how such a system would provide an objective and 
administratively feasible means of determining consent for those class members 
who emailed with Yahoo Mail subscriber in the past, much less those who will 
send such email in the future. 
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Resolution of plaintiffs’ claims will require a fact-specific and individualized 
inquiry as to whether each class member has consented to Yahoo’s business 
practices.  That inquiry should have defeated both commonality and cohesiveness. 
The district court’s certification of a class including every non-Yahoo Mail 
subscriber in the United States—regardless of whether they read, are aware of, or 
expressly consented to Yahoo’s terms and conditions—cannot be reconciled with 
Rule 23(a)(2)’s commonality requirement as elucidated by the Supreme Court’s 
decision in Wal-Mart. 
As the Supreme Court has explained, “[c]ommonality requires the plaintiff 
to demonstrate that the class members have suffered the same injury,” such that 
“all their claims can productively be litigated at once.”  Wal-Mart, 131 S. Ct. at 
2551.  Commonality is thus satisfied only “where the plaintiffs’ claims rest on a 
‘common contention’ whose ‘truth or falsity will resolve an issue that is central to 
the validity of each one of the claims in one stroke.’”  Parsons v. Ryan, 754 F.3d 
657, 681 (9th Cir. 2014) (quoting Wal-Mart, 131 S. Ct. at 2551).  “Dissimilarities 
within the proposed class are what have the potential to impede the generation of 
common answers.”  Wal-Mart, 131 S. Ct. at 2551. 
Relying predominately on pre-Wal-Mart precedent, the district court held 
that the commonality requirement was satisfied here because the court found “an 
issue” that could be resolved on a classwide basis.  App. 20.  But not every 
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common question provides a basis for a finding of commonality.  Instead, as the 
Court in Wal-Mart explained, the common question must be one that will “drive 
the resolution of the litigation.”  131 S. Ct. at 2551.  The Wal-Mart Court identified 
numerous “common” questions in the case before it:  “Do all of us plaintiffs indeed 
work for Wal-Mart? Do our managers have discretion over pay? Is that an 
unlawful employment practice? What remedies should we get?”  Id.  The Court 
emphasized, however, that merely “[r]eciting these questions is not sufficient to 
obtain class certification.”  Id.  The “crucial question” for purposes of satisfying 
Rule 23(a)(2) was “why was I disfavored?”—a question that could not be 
answered with common evidence for each class member.  Id. at 2551-52.  
Commonality requires “the capacity of a classwide proceeding to generate 
common answers apt to drive the resolution of the litigation.”  Id. at 2551. 
Here, the district court’s certification will not “generate common answers 
apt to drive the resolution of the litigation.”  Id.  Plaintiffs contend that Yahoo 
intercepts email sent to and from all Yahoo Mail subscribers, in violation of 
California Penal Code § 631(a), and discloses email content to third parties, in 
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2702(a)(1).  Both of these claims fundamentally turn on 
whether Yahoo’s acts were without “consent.”  Cal. Penal Code § 631(a); 18 
U.S.C. § 2702(b)(3).  Yet consent cannot be resolved “in one stroke.”  Wal-Mart, 
131 S. Ct. at 2551.  Indeed, the district court conceded that “Yahoo may be correct 
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that consent could present legal and factual questions that are not common to the 
proposed class.”  App. 19.   
Similarly, the fact-specific and individualized nature of consent renders the 
class non-cohesive for purposes of Rule 23(b)(2).  See Barnes v. Am. Tobacco Co., 
161 F.3d 127, 143 (3d Cir. 1998) (“While 23(b)(2) class actions have no 
predominance or superiority requirements, it is well established that the class 
claims must be cohesive.”).  In certifying a class of all non-Yahoo Mail subscribers 
in the United States, the district court gave little weight to that requirement.  Rather 
than require a cohesive class, the district court held that it does not matter that all 
class members who might receive an injunction might not be entitled to (or even 
desire) that relief.  App. 32. 
But in Wal-Mart, the Supreme Court explained that the “key to the (b)(2) 
class is the indivisible nature of the injunctive or declaratory remedy warranted—
the notion that the conduct is such that it can be enjoined or declared unlawful only 
as to all of the class members or as to none of them.”  Wal-Mart, 131 S. Ct. at 2557 
(internal quotation marks omitted); see Parsons, 754 F.3d at 689 (concluding that 
Rule 23(b)(2)’s requirement that injunctive relief be “appropriate respecting the 
class as a whole” is satisfied where there is “an injury that can be remedied on a 
class-wide basis”).  This requirement “operates under the presumption that the 
interests of the class members are cohesive and homogeneous such that the case 
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will not depend on adjudication of facts particular to any subset of the class nor 
require a remedy that differentiates materially among class members.”  Lemon v. 
Int’l Union of Operating Eng’rs, 216 F.3d 577, 580 (7th Cir. 2000).  
Here, this requirement should have precluded certification.  As discussed 
above, resolution of plaintiffs’ claims necessarily depends on the fact-specific and 
individualized inquiry of consent.  Given that only some (but not all) class 
members may be eligible for injunctive relief due to their lack of consent, there is 
no cohesive class such that Yahoo’s conduct “can be enjoined or declared unlawful 
only as to all of the class members or as to none of them.”  Wal-Mart, 131 S. Ct. at 
2557.  This Court should grant review to correct the district court’s manifest error 
in concluding otherwise. 
CONCLUSION 
The petition should be granted. 
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